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TRUSTS: REMAINDER INTERESTS RENDERED TESTAMENTARY BY SETTLOR'S RETENTION OF EXCESSIVE
CONTROL OVER TRUST
Hanson v. Denckla, 100 So.2d 378 (Fla. 1956),, rev'd on other grounds,
78 Sup. Ct. 1228 (1958)
Testator-settlor created an inter vivos trust, reserving the right to
receive the income from the trust for life. She further reserved the
right to alter, amend, or revoke the trust in whole or in part at any
time and retained a general power of appointment over the trust res.
The trust instrument provided that the trustee could not sell, lease,
exchange, or invest the trust property or participate in any plan or
proceeding for enforcing any right or obligation arising from securities held in trust without the written consent of an "adviser" to
be appointed by the settlor. Plaintiffs, residuary legatees under the
settlor's will, petitioned for a declaratory decree to have the appointment of beneficiaries under the trust instrument declared invalid as
an attempted testamentary disposition of property without compliance
with the Statute of Wills. The trial court granted the decree. On
appeal, HELD, the settlor retained virtually plenary control over the
trust res and thereby rendered the remainder interests "illusory" and
invalid. Reversed in part on another point.
To establish a valid inter vivos trust the settlor must intend to
create a trust 2 and to vest a present interest in the beneficiaries. 3
Retention of excessive control over the trust res negatives the necessary intents and renders the remainder interests testamentary in
character and void unless the trust instrument is executed in compliance with the Statute of Wills. 4 However, the line of demarcation

between a valid and a testamentary inter vivos trust is a very thin one,
with the amount of control retained by the settlor as the determinative
factor. As a general rule the retention of any one particular right
or power to control the trust or the trustee will not suffice to invalidate
'Though the instant case is dated 1956, it first appeared in the March 1958
reports. The parties relitigated the case in Delaware, that court refusing to recognize the Florida decision as res judicata, and obtained a contrary result. Lewis v.
Hansen, 128 A.2d 819 (Del.), cert. granted, 354 U.S. 920 (1957).
21 ScoT, TRUSTS §23 (2d ed. 1956).
3RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS §56 (1935). See also the collection of cases in 89 C.J.S.,

Trusts §89, n.55 (1955).
494 C.J.S., Wills §143 (1956).
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the remainders. Rather it is the sum of the retained rights and powers,
when so extensive as to constitute the settlor as virtual owner of the
property and the trustee a mere agent, that will render a trust
testamentary.5
The settlor may, in the absence of statutory prohibition, reserve
the power to amend or revoke in whole or in part at any time without
making the trust illusory.6 In addition, by the great weight of authority, the settlor may retain a life estate in the income without
affecting the validity of the trust.7 Generally the fact that the settlor
appoints himself as trustee appears to be immaterial.8 As a rule the
courts are quite lenient in upholding the validity of remainders in
spite of the great lengths to which settlors have gone in retaining control over the trust.9 No formula for determining when the amount of
reserved control is excessive is apparent from the cases. There are,
however, other operative factors in addition to the amount of control retained. 10 One example is the right of a wife to dower in her
husband's estate. This factor can result in a trust being held invalid
that would otherwise be valid if control were the only test."1
2
In the instant case the Court stated:'
"We re-emphasize that we do not, and need not hold that
the reservation of the power of appointment, or any other factor
standing alone, would suffice to invalidate the remainder interest sought to be created under this trust. It is enough to
observe that if, as to remaindermen, this trust is not invalid as
an agency agreement, and testamentary . . . it is difficult to
5

See, e.g., Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937); Cleveland Trust
Co. v. White, 134 Ohio St. 1, 15 N.E.2d 627 (1958).
6
Williams v. Collier, 120 Fla. 248, 158 So. 815 (1935). See also RESTATEMENT,
TRUSTS §57 (1935); collection of cases in 89 C.J.S., Trusts §89, n.55 (1955).
7Williams v. Collier, supra note 6; Stouse v. First Nat'l Bank, 245 S.W.2d 914
(Ky. 1951); see Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 1279 (1953).
8See 1 ScoTr, TRUSTS §56.6 (2d ed. 1956).
oSee, e.g., Lewis v. Hansen, 128 A.2d 819 (Del. 1957); Williams v. Collier, supra
note 6; Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Weinold, 12 Ill. App.2d 209, 138 N.E.2d 840
(1956).
10E.g., Merz v. Tower Grove Bank and Trust Co., 344 Mo. 1150, 130 S.W.2d
611 (1939); Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E.2d 381 (1944).
"1E.g., Merz v .Tower Grove Bank and Trust Co., supra note 10; Newman v.
Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.X2d 966 (1937); Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., supra note
10.
22At 385.
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understand what further control could be retained by the
settlor to produce this result, and the principles to which we
have alluded would lose their meaning."
Although the Court does not speak directly of intent, it alludes to it
at one point as if to indicate that the intent of the settlor was neither
to vest title in the trustee nor to vest present interests in the beneficiaries.
A prior Florida case, Williams v. Collier,1 upheld a revocable
trust in which the settlor had reserved a life interest as well as ownership of the trust res "subject only to consummation of the trust."
In denying the widow's contention that the trust was a fraud on
her dower rights, the Court stressed the settlor's bona fide intent to
create an inter vivos trust and the fact that the widow was amply
provided for under the settlor's will. The Court did not discuss the
settlor's retention of extensive control over the trust during his life.
In the instant case the Court stated that "this is a matter of first
impression in this state.' 14 Thus it appears that the Court discounted
the Williams case as a precedent for cases not involving dower. It is
significant, however, that the only major distinction between the
Williams trust and the one in the instant case is the retention of a
power of appointment in the latter. Perhaps this is the "straw that
broke the camel's back."
It is difficult at this stage to ascertain what amount of control over
the trust res may be retained by the settlor without rendering the
remainder interests invalid. There are too many operative factors
involved to deduce a general rule, and predicting a result will be
difficult in any case in which the settlor has retained a large degree
of control. But the instant case should serve as a warning to drafters
of trust instruments that the remainder interests may be held invalid
if the settlor retains excessive control over the trust.
LEONARD ANTON

13120 FIa. 248, 158 So. 815, rehearing denied with opinion, 162 So. 868 (1935).
'4At 382.
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